# 1nc

### 1nc

#### A. Interpretation - Economic Engagement is defined as expanding economic ties with a country to change its behavior – this means they have to be gov to gov

**Kahler, 6** - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego (M., “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait” in Journal of Peace Research (2006), 43:5, p. 523-541, Sage Publications)

Economic engagement - a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and improve bilateral political relations

####  ‘Its’ is a possessive pronoun showing ownership

**Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005** – (“Term: Possessive Pronoun,”

http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.

EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

#### **B. Violation – the plan \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

#### **C. Voting Issue**

#### **1. Limits – a government limit is the only way to keep the topic manageable – otherwise they could use any 3rd party intermediary, lift barriers to private engagement, or target civil society – it makes topic preparation impossible**

#### **2. Negative ground – formal governmental channels are key to predictable relations disads and counterplans that test ‘engagement’**

#### **3. Effects topicality is a voter – the aff could claim advantages off any part of the internal link chain that makes them topical – kills predictability and limits**

### 1nc

#### The affirmative’s concept of violence as external from their own lives allows individuals to abdicate their responsibility. Denial of our individual culpability with violence forecloses the possibility of meaningful change; in the process, violence becomes more likely.

Kappeler in 1995 [Susanne Kappeler, *The Will To Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior,* pg 1-4]

What is striking is that the violence which is talked about is always the violence committed by someone else: women talk about the violence of men, adults about the violence of young people; the left, liberals and the centre about the violence of right extremists; the right, centre and liberals about the violence of leftist extremists; political activists talk about structural violence, police and politicians about violence in the `street', and all together about the violence in our society. Similarly, Westerners talk about violence in the Balkans, Western citizens together with their generals about the violence of the Serbian army. Violence is recognized and measured by its visible effects, the spectacular blood of wounded bodies, the material destruction of objects, the visible damage left in the world of `objects'. In its measurable damage we see the proof that violence has taken place, the violence being reduced to this damage. The violation as such, or invisible forms of violence - the non-physical violence of threat and terror, of insult and humiliation, the violation of human dignity - are hardly ever the issue except to some extent in feminist and anti-racist analyses, or under the name of psychological violence. Here violence is recognized by the victims and defined from their perspective - an important step away from the catalogue of violent acts and the exclusive evidence of material traces in the object. Yet even here the focus tends to be on the effects and experience of violence, either the objective and scientific measure of psychological damage, or the increasingly subjective definition of violence as experience. Violence is perceived as a phenomenon for science to research and for politics to get a grip on. But violence is not a phenomenon: it is the behaviour of people, human action which may be analysed. What is missing is an analysis of violence as action - not just as acts of violence, or the cause of its effects, but as the actions of people in relation to other people and beings or things. Feminist critique, as well as other political critiques, has analysed the preconditions of violence, the unequal power relations which enable it to take place. However, under the pressure of mainstream science and a sociological perspective which increasingly dominates our thinking, it is becoming standard to argue as if it were these power relations which cause the violence. Underlying is a behaviourist model which prefers to see human action as the exclusive product of circumstances, ignoring the personal decision of the agent to act, implying in turn that circumstances virtually dictate certain forms of behaviour. Even though we would probably not underwrite these propositions in their crass form, there is nevertheless a growing tendency, not just in social science, to explain violent behaviour by its circumstances. (Compare the question, `Does pornography cause violence?') The circumstances identified may differ according to the politics of the explainers, but the method of explanation remains the same. While consideration of mitigating circumstances has its rightful place in a court of law trying (and defending) an offender, this does not automatically make it an adequate or sufficient practice for political analysis. It begs the question, in particular, `What is considered to be part of the circumstances (and by whom)?' Thus in the case of sexual offenders, there is a routine search - on the part of the tabloid press or professionals of violence - for experiences of violence in the offender's own past, an understanding which is rapidly solidifying in scientific model of a `cycle of violence'. That is, the relevant factors are sought in the distant past and in other contexts of action, e a crucial factor in the present context is ignored, namely the agent's decision to act as he did. Even politically oppositional groups are not immune to this mainstream sociologizing. Some left groups have tried to explain men's sexual violence as the result of class oppression, while some Black theoreticians have explained the violence of Black men as the result of racist oppression. The ostensible aim of these arguments may be to draw attention to the pervasive and structural violence of classism and racism, yet they not only fail to combat such inequality, they actively contribute to it. Although such oppression is a very real part of an agent's life context, these `explanations' ignore the fact that not everyone experiencing the same oppression uses violence, that is, that these circumstances do not `cause' violent behaviour. They overlook, in other words, that the perpetrator has decided to violate, even if this decision was made in circumstances of limited choice. To overlook this decision, however, is itself a political decision, serving particular interests. In the first instance it serves to exonerate the perpetrators, whose responsibility is thus transferred to circumstances and a history for which other people (who remain beyond reach) are responsible. Moreover, it helps to stigmatize all those living in poverty and oppression; because they are obvious victims of violence and oppression, they are held to be potential perpetrators themselves.' This slanders all the women who have experienced sexual violence, yet do not use violence against others, and libels those experiencing racist and class oppression, yet do not necessarily act out violence. Far from supporting those oppressed by classist, racist or sexist oppression, it sells out these entire groups in the interest of exonerating individual members. It is a version of collective victim-blaming, of stigmatizing entire social strata as potential hotbeds of violence, which rests on and perpetuates the mainstream division of society into so-called marginal groups - the classic clienteles of social work and care politics (and of police repression) - and an implied `centre' to which all the speakers, explainers, researchers and careers themselves belong, and which we are to assume to be a zone of non-violence. Explaining people's violent behaviour by their circumstances also has the advantage of implying that the `solution' lies in a change to circumstances. Thus it has become fashionable among socially minded politicians and intellectuals in Germany to argue that the rising neo-Nazi violence of young people (men), especially in former East Germany, needs to be countered by combating poverty and unemployment in these areas. Likewise anti-racist groups like the Anti. Racist Alliance or the Anti-Nazi League in Britain argue that `the causes of racism, like poverty and unemployment, should be tackled and that it is `problems like unemployment and bad housing which lead to racism'.' Besides being no explanation at all of why (white poverty and unemployment should lead specifically to racist violence (and what would explain middle- and upper-class racism), it is more than questionable to combat poverty only (but precisely) when and where violence is exercised. It not only legitimates the violence (by `explaining' it), but constitutes an incentive to violence, confirming that social problems will be taken seriously when and where `they attract attention by means of violence - just as the most unruly children in schools (mostly boys) tend to get more attention from teachers than well-behaved and quiet children (mostly girls). Thus if German neo-Nazi youths and youth groups, since their murderous assaults on refugees and migrants in Hoyerswerda, Rostock, Dresden etc., are treated to special youth projects and social care measures (to the tune of DM 20 million per year), including `educative' trips to Morocco and Israel,' this is am unmistakable signal to society that racist violence does indeed 'pay off'.

#### Political violence is sustained by organized thinking that looks at violence through meta-analysis. We need to have deeper insight that realizes that each of us is culpable for violence. This is integral to ending the cycle of violence and reclaiming agency.

Kappeler in 1995 [Susanne Kappeler, *The Will To Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior,* pg 8-11]

Moreover, personal behaviour is no alternative to `political' action; there is no question of either/or. My concern, on the contrary, is the connection between these recognized forms of violence and the forms of everyday behaviour which we consider `normal' but which betray our own will to violence - the connection, in other words, between our own actions and those acts of violence which are normally the focus of our political critiques. Precisely because there is no choice between dedicating oneself either to `political issues' or to `personal behaviour', the question of the politics of personal behaviour has (also) to be moved into the centre of our politics and our critique. Violence - what we usually recognize as such - is no exception to the rules, no deviation from the normal and nothing out of the ordinary, in a society in which exploitation and oppression are the norm, the ordinary and the rule. It is no misbehaviour of a minority amid good behaviour by the majority, nor the deeds of inhuman monsters amid humane humans, in a society in which there is no equality, in which people divide others according to race, class, sex and many other factors in order to rule, exploit, use, objectify, enslave, sell, torture and kill them, in which millions of animals are tortured, genetically manipulated, enslaved and slaughtered daily for `harmless' consumption by humans. It is no error of judgement, no moral lapse and no transgression against the customs of a culture which is thoroughly steeped in the values of profit and desire, of self-realization, expansion and progress. Violence as we usually perceive it is `simply' a specific - and to us still visible - form of violence, the consistent and logical application of the principles of our culture and everyday life. War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation, the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the `outbreak' of war, of sexual violence, of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war', writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, `what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell [my friend], but I see it everywhere. It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you, in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war ... And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible, we permit it to happen. ' `We are the war' - and we also `are' the sexual violence, the racist violence, the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called `peacetime', for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. `We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens - even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia - since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers. For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution.' 7 , We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non-comprehension': our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence. So if we move beyond the usual frame of violence, towards the structures of thought employed in decisions to act, this also means making an analysis of action. This seems all the more urgent as action seems barely to be perceived any longer. There is talk of the government doing `nothing', of its `inaction', of the need for action, the time for action, the need for strategies, our inability to act as well as our desire to become `active' again. We seem to deem ourselves in a kind of action vacuum which, like the cosmic black hole, tends to consume any renewed effort only to increase its size. Hence this is also an attempt to shift the focus again to the fact that we are continually acting and doing, and that there is no such thing as not acting or doing nothing.

#### The alternative is to vote negative --- their analysis of violence is insufficient and you should punish their failure by politicizing the way we think about violence can we find ways to end the cycle of violence.

**Kappeler in 1995** [Susanne Kappeler, *The Will To Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior,* pg 4-5]

If we nevertheless continue to explain violence by its ‘circumstances’ and attempt to counter it by changing these circumstances, it is also because in this way we stay in command of the problem. In particular, we do not complicate the problem by any suggestions that it might be people who need to change. Instead, we turn the perpetrators of violence into the victims of circumstances, who as victims by definition, cannot act sensibly (but in changed circumstances will behave differently. ‘We,’ on the other hand, are the subjects able to take in hand the task of changing the circumstances. Even if changing the circumstance – combating poverty, unemployment, injustice, etc. – may not be easy, it nevertheless remains within ‘our’ scope at least theoretically and by means of state power. Changing people, on the other hand, is neither within our power nor, it seems, ultimately in our interest: we prefer to keep certain people under control, putting limits on their violent behavior, but we apparently have no interest in a politics that presupposes people's ability to change and aims at changing attitudes and behavior. For changing (as opposed to restricting) other people's behavior is beyond the range and in­fluence of our own power; only they themselves can change it. It requires their will to change, their will not to abuse power and not to use violence. A politics aiming at a change in people's behavior would require political work that is very much more cumbersome and very much less promising of success than is the use of state power and social control. It would require political consciousness-raising — politicizing the way we think — which cannot be imposed on others by force or compulsory educational measures. It would require a view of people which takes seriously and reckons with their will, both their will to violence and their will to change. To take seriously the will of others however would mean recognizing one's own, and putting people's will, including our own, at the centre of political reflection. A political analysis of violence needs to recognize this will, the personal decision in favour of violence - not just to describe acts of violence, or the conditions which enable them to take place, but also to capture the moment of decision which is the real impetus for violent action. For without this decision there will be no violent act, not even in circumstances which potentially permit it. It is the 3decision to violate, not just the act itself, which makes a person a perpetrator of violence - just as it is the decision not to do so which makes people not act violently and not abuse their power in a situation which would nevertheless permit it. This moment of decision, there­fore, is also the locus of potential resistance to violence. To understand the structures of thinking and the criteria, by which such decisions are reached, but above all to regard this decision as an act of choice, seems to me a necessary precondition for any political struggle against violence and for a non-violent society.

### 1nc

#### Text: the United States federal government should add every country to the list of countries governed by Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act. The United States federal government should cease current and ban future projects of regime change, economic sanctions, military base expansion, military occupation, military assistance for strategic partners, isolation of disapproved political movements, and counterterrorism operations to countries governed by Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act.

#### Counterplan solves – the aff takes Cuba off the list of state sponsors of terrorism, the counterplan adds every country to the list of state sponsors of terrorism but says being on the list of state sponsors of terrorism prevents the US from being able to militarily or coercively intervene in that country’s affairs. Your author concludes the only reason the list is problematic is it allows neoconservative approaches towards those countries, but we solve that better

**Jackson 7 -** Professor in International Politics at Aberystwyth University (Richard, “Critical reflection on counter-sanctuary discourse”, In: M. Innes, ed. Denial of sanctuary: understanding terrorist safe havens, p. 30-33) //RGP

A related problem for the "terrorist sanctuaries" discourse is that it has always been characterized by a certain political bias and selectivity. For example, an analysis of the mainstream terrorism literature during the Cold War demonstrates that terrorism experts regularly identified Iran, Libya, Cuba, the Soviet Union and many other mainly communist countries as "state sponsors" of "international terrorism," but failed to include countries like Israel or South Africa—despite the fact that South Africa, for example, not only engaged in numerous acts of terrorism against dissidents in neighbouring states but also sponsored movements like Unita and Renamo who engaged in extensive terrorism. The "terrorist sanctuaries" literature from this period also focused heavily on the assistance provided by states like Libya and Syria to groups like the PLO, but failed to discuss U.S. support for groups like the Afghan Mujahaddin. anti-Castro groups, and the Contras, despite the fact these groups engaged in numerous acts of terrorism, including planting car bombs in markets, kidnappings, civilian massacres, and blowing up civilian airliners.51 Many would argue that from this perspective, the "terrorist sanctuaries" discourse has functioned ideologically to distract from and deny the long history of the West's direct involvement in state terrorism and its support and sanctuary for a number of anticommunist terrorist groups. Western involvement in terrorism has a long but generally ignored history, which includes: the extensive use of official terror by Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, the United States, and other colonial powers in numerous countries throughout the colonial period; U.S. support and sanctuary for a range of right-wing insurgent groups like the Contras and the Mujahideen during the Cold War 53; U.S. tolerance of Irish Republican terrorist activity in the United States54: U.S. support for systematic state terror by numerous right-wing regimes across the world, perhaps most notoriously El Salvador, Chile, Guatemala, Indonesia. and Iran 55; British support for Loyalist terrorism in Northern Irelands 56 and various other "Islamist" groups in Libya and Bosnia, among others57; Spanish state terror during the "dirty war" against ETA58; French support for terror in Algeria and against Greenpeace in the Rainbow Warrior bombing; Italian sponsorship of right-wing terrorists; and Western support for accommodation with terrorists following the end of several high profile wars59—among many other examples. In short. there is no denying that the discourse has often been used in a highly selective manner to highlight some acts of terror whilst selectively ignoring others. Arguably, this political bias continues today: the Taliban forces in Afghanistan are more often described as terrorists than insurgents, while various warlords, including General Rashid Dostum, are rarely,' called terrorists. despite overwhelming evidence of their use of terror and intimidation against civilians. This situation is mirrored in Somalia, where the Islamist Al Itihad Al Islam iya group is typically described as a terrorist organization with links to al Qaeda, while U.S.-supported Somali warlords who also use violence against civilians arc exempted from the terrorist label.61 Similarly, Cuba remains on the State Department's list of "state sponsors of terrorism," but continued U.S. sanctuary and support of anti-Castro terrorists,62 former Latin American state terrorists63 and other assorted Asian anticommunist groups64 is completely ignored. Most glaringly, the state terror of countries like Uzbekistan, Colombia, and Indonesia—and continued tolerance and support for it from the U.S.65—is hardly ever discussed in the mainstream "terrorist sanctuaries" literature. From a discourse analytic perspective, it can further be argued that the "terrorist sanctuaries" discourse often functions to promote a set of partisan political projects. For example, the discourse describes an almost infinite number of potential "terrorist sanctuaries" or "havens," including: all failed, weak, or poor states; the widely accepted list of state sponsors of terrorism: a much longer list of passive state sponsors of terrorism; states with significant Muslim populations; Islamic charities and NGOs; informal, unregulated banking and economic systems; the media; the Internet; diasporas in Western countries; groups and regions characterized by poverty and unemployment; the criminal world; radical Islamist organizations; mosques and Islamic schools; insurgent and revolutionary movements; and "extremist" ideologies—among others. The identification of these groups and domains as "terrorist sanctuaries" or "havens" then functions to permit a range of restrictive and coercive actions against them—all in the name of counterterrorism. The point is that there may be other political reasons for taking action against such groups which the "terrorist sanctuary" label obscures. From this perspective, the "terrorist sanctuaries" discourse can be shown to support a range of discrete political projects and interests, including: limiting expressions of dissent; controlling the media; centralizing executive power; creating a surveillance society; expanding state regulation of social life; retargeting the focus of military force from dissident groups and individuals (which privileges law enforcement) to states (which privileges the powerful military-industrial complex); legitimating broader counterinsurgency programmes where the real aims lie in the maintenance of a particular political-economic order66; de-legitimizing all forms of counterhegemonic or revolutionary struggle, thereby functioning as a means of maintaining the liberal international order; and selectively justifying projects of regime change**,67** economic sanctions, military base expansion, military occupation, military assistance for strategic partners, and the isolation of disapproved political movements. In short, the discourse functions—in its present form—to permit the extension of Western state hegemony both internationally and domestically. I Ineffectual Policies A final criticism of the "terrorist sanctuaries" discourse is that it has proved in its prescriptions to be largely ineffectual and in many cases, counterproductive. In particular. the policy of employing military force against "terrorist sanctuaries" or "havens," a reasonable policy within the confines of the discourse, actually has an astonishing record of failure. For example, Israel has mounted military strikes and targeted assassination against "terrorist sanctuaries" in the Palestinian territories and surrounding states for over fifty years without any significant reduction in the overall level of terrorism. The apartheid regime in South Africa adopted a similarly futile policy against its neighbours during the 1980s. U.S. military strikes on Libya in 1986, Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, and the use of force in the current War on Terror against Afghanistan and Iraq, have also failed to noticeably reduce the overall number of terrorist attacks against U.S. interests. More broadly, the use of military force against "terrorist sanctuaries" in Colombia, Chechnya, Kashmir, Sri Lanka. the Philippines, Turkey, and elsewhere has in every case failed to appreciably affect the level of antistate terrorist violence. It could be argued that the attempts since September 11 to eliminate "terrorist sanctuaries" in Afghanistan. Iraq, and South Lebanon in particular, have in fact, had the opposite effect. In many respects, these military interventions have solidified and greatly strengthened various Middle Eastern insurgent and "terrorist" groups, reinforced new militant movements and coalitions, provided new regions of conflict where dissident groups can gain military experience and greatly in creased overall levels of anti-Western sentiment across the region." It is probable that the price of these policies will be many more years of insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, and an ongoing international terrorist campaign against U.S. interests and its allies. The main problem of course, is that the discourse focuses on the symptoms and enablers of dissident terrorism, rather than its underlying drivers and poses a palliative remedy rather than a curative one. From this viewpoint, it is actually an impediment to dealing with terrorism because it functions as a closed system of discourse, preventing discussion of the political grievances which cause individuals and groups to seek out places of sanctuary from where they can launch attacks in the first place. CONCLUSION There is a need for researchers and public officials to be far more reflective and critical of the language they employ and the "knowledge" they produce, because discourse and knowledge is never neutral; it always works for someone and for something. In this case, the language and knowledge of the "terrorism sanctuaries" discourse frequently works to maintain the hegemony of certain powerful states and a particular international order which is beneficial to a few, but violent and unjust to many more. It also works to obscure the much greater violence and suffering caused by current Western counterterrorism policies (which have cost the lives of well over 40,000 civilians69 and caused incalculable material destruction since September 11. 2001), the double standards and selectivity of Western approaches to terrorism and the ongoing problem of civilian-directed state terror.

### 1nc

#### Aff frees up resources to be used for the War on Terror

**Levy 11** – Lecturer and Doctoral Candidate at the Josef Korbel School of International Affairs at the University of Denver, received the Leonard Marks Essay Award of the American Academy of Diplomacy, masters degree from Columbia in International Affairs. (Arturo, Center for International policy/Latin American Working Group, “A Call for Cuba’s Removal from the List of State Sponsers of Terrorism,” 12/1/11, [http://www.lawg.org/storage/documents/Cuba/lawg\_cip\_dec\_2011.pdf)//](http://www.lawg.org/storage/documents/Cuba/lawg_cip_dec_2011.pdf%29/) RGP

So, let me discuss the first issue, why including Cuba on the terrorist list harms American ¶ efforts and leadership in the Global War against terrorism. Cuba’s inclusion on the list is based on bogus allegations that undermine its credibility. By ¶ lumping Cuba together with Iran, Syria, and Sudan, a potentially effective foreign policy tool for ¶ warning Americans and the international community against countries that “repeatedly provide ¶ support for international terrorism” becomes a list of governments that some South Floridians ¶ don’t like. Foreign policy is not about therapy. If the goal is to provide right wing Cuban ¶ Americans a venue for catharsis, there are other ways less harmful to US national security for ¶ them to vent their frustrations.¶ The list of terrorism sponsoring nations should be a bargaining tool for dealing with, well, ¶ countries that engage in or sponsor terrorism. The misuse of a first level national security ¶ concern must give pause to responsible members of the Washington Foreign Policy community. ¶ First, it distracts efforts and resources in the wrong direction, taking eyes and dollars from ¶ where the real threats are. Second, it sends the wrong messages to other countries, diminishing ¶ the appeal of the list as a warning against countries such as Iran or Syria, in which the threat of ¶ cooperation with and sponsorship of terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah against the ¶ United States and our allies is really serious. Third, it weakens the capacity of US allies like Israel ¶ or India, who are real targets of terrorist threats, to make a case for sanctioning or monitoring ¶ of countries or entities such as Iran whose presence on the list is justified. ¶ The three Cuba Reports (2008, 09, and 10) by the State Department Office of the Coordinator ¶ for Counterterrorism written under the Obama Administration are more an argument for ¶ removing rather than for keeping the island on the list. This is particularly evident in the ¶ discussion of Cuba’s alleged links with three groups connected to international terrorist ¶ activities: The FARC and the ELN from Colombia, and the Spanish ETA. In addition to ETA’s ¶ recent announcement of its demobilization, making this a non issue, the presence of members

#### Anti-terror efforts are only a symptom of a neoliberal domestic agenda

**Lafer 4** - political economist and is an Associate Professor at the University of Oregon's Labor Education and Research Center (Gordon, “Neoliberalism by other means: the “war on terror” at home and abroad,” New Political Science 26:3, 2004, Taylor and Francis) //RGP

If the war in Iraq is really about something other than weapons, what is the domestic “war on terror” about? At ﬁrst glance, the war at home appears to be more straightforward: a genuine if heavy-handed effort to prevent a repeat of anything like the attacks of September 11, 2001. But here too, the administration’s actions point to motives that are mixed at best. On the one hand, genuine security measures are often treated with a surprising degree of laxity. Whistleblowers within the federal intelligence community complain that problems identiﬁed two years ago have remained unresolved. The multicolored national security alerts have produced great public drama but, as far as the public has been told, have never had any relationship to major terrorist attacks either committed or deterred. Critical needs such as preparing the public health system to cope with potential bioterrorist attacks, or supporting the anti-terrorism work of state and local police, have gone unfunded as the monies were diverted to tax cuts.34 At the same time, a wide range of initiatives apparently unrelated to anything to do with terrorism—including the tax cuts, “fast track” authority, and deunionization of federal jobs, have all been advanced as critical components of the war on terror.35 I assume that the government is genuinely interested in preventing terrorism. Nevertheless, these facts suggest that the administration’s agenda is more complex, and much more ambitious than simply that of protecting the population from future attacks. And while any one of these items may be viewed as an individual case of cronyism or opportunism, the broader pattern points to the need for a deeper theory of what is driving the regime’s domestic agenda. I believe that the domestic agenda, too, can only be understood in the context of neoliberal globalization. One of the axioms of globalization is that capital accumulation has become disconnected from the nation-state. Before “global city” became the mantra of Chamber of Commerce boosters everywhere, it was geographer SaskiaSassen’s term for the locales that are home to the administrative headquarters of far-ﬂung corporate empires.36 As corporate production, distribution and services have grown into complex, worldwide networks, those at the top need ever greater capacity at central headquarters in order to coordinate these global empires. A handful of cities have come to serve as the central hubs of ﬁnancial, legal, accounting, marketing and telecommunicationsfunctions for global capital. These cities are “global” because their dominant industries participate in an economy that is increasingly disconnected from the fortunes of any particular nation. The functional colleagues of New York lawyers and stockbrokers are London lawyers and brokers. By contrast, both have increasingly little economic connection to normal manufacturing and service workers. The latter are stuck in a parallel economy that, while sharing the same physical and political space, has no means of participating in the growing fortunes of corporate empires. It may never have been true that what was good for GM was good for America, but over the past 20 years the connection between the success of “American” companies and the prosperity of Americans has grown threadbare.

#### This neoliberalism and imperialist conquest inevitably results in extinction, every modern war has been a byproduct of the spread of colonialism

**Harvey 6** - Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York (David, “Spaces of Global Capitalism: A Theory of Uneven Geographical Development,” Chapter 13, 5/7/2013) //RGP

At times of savage devaluation, interregional rivalries typically degenerate into struggles over who is to bear the burden of devaluation. The export of unemployment, of inflation, of idle productive capacity become the stakes in the game. Trade wars, dumping, interest rate wars, restrictions on capital flow and foreign exchange, immigration policies, colonial conquest, the subjugation and domination of tributary economies, the forced reorganization of the division of labour within economic empires, and, finally, the physical destruction and forced devaluation of a rival's capital through war are some of the methods at hand. Each entails the aggressive manipulation of some aspect of economic, financial or state power. The politics of imperialism, the sense that the contradictions of capitalism can be cured through world domination by some omnipotent power, surges to the forefront. The ills of capitalism cannot so easily be contained. Yet the degeneration of economic into political struggles plays its part in the long-run stabilization of capitalism, provided enough capital is destroyed en route. Patriotism and nationalism have many functions in the contemporary world and may arise for diverse reasons; but they frequently provide a most convenient cover for the devaluation of both capital and labour. We will shortly return to this aspect of matters since it is, I believe, by far the most serious threat, not only to the survival of capitalism (which matters not a jot), but to the survival of the human race. Twice in the twentieth century, the world has been plunged into global war through inter-imperialist rivalries. Twice in the space of a generation, the world experienced the massive devaluation of capital through physical destruction, the ultimate consumption of labour power as cannon fodder. Class warfare, of course, has taken its toll in life and limb, mainly through the violence daily visited by capital upon labour in the work place and through the violence of primitive accumulation (including imperialist wars fought against other social formations in the name of capitalist 'freedoms'). But the vast losses incurred in two world wars were provoked by inter-imperialist rivalries. How can this be explained on the basis of a theory that appeals to the class relation between capital and labour as fundamental to the interpretation of history? This was, of course, the problem with which Lenin wrestled in his essay on imperialism. But his argument, as we saw in chapter 10, is plagued by ambiguity. Is finance capital national or international? What is the relation, then, between the military and political deployment of state power and the undoubted trend within capitalism to create multinational forms and to forge global spatial integration? And if monopolies and finance capital were so powerful and prone in any case to collusion, then why could they not contain capitalism's contradictions short of destroying each other? What is it, then, that makes inter-imperialist wars necessary to the survival of capitalism? The 'third cut' at crisis theory suggests an interpretation of inter-imperialist wars as constitutive moments in the dynamics of accumulation, rather than as abberations, accidents or the simple product of excessive greed. Let us see how this is so. When the 'inner dialectic' at work within a region drives it to seek external resolutions to its problems, then it must search out new markets, new opportunities for capital export, cheap raw materials, low-cost labour power, etc. All such measures, if they are to be anything other than a temporary palliative, either put a claim on future labour or else directly entail an expansion of the proletariat. This expansion can be accomplished through population growth, the mobilization of latent sectors of the reserve army, or primitive accumulation. The insatiable thirst of capitalism for fresh supplies of labour accounts for the vigour with which it has pursued primitive accumulation, destroying, transforming and absorbing pre-capitalist populations wherever it finds them. When surpluses of labour are there for the taking, and capitalists have not, through competition, erroneously pinned their fates to a technological mix which cannot absorb that labour, then crises are typically of short duration, mere hiccups on a general trajectory of sustained global accumulation, and usually manifest as mild switching crises within an evolving structure of uneven geographical development. This was standard fare for nineteenth-century capitalism. The real troubles begin when capitalists, fating shortages of labour supply and as ever urged on by competition, induce unemployment through technological innovations which disturb the equilibrium between production and realization, between the productive forces and their accompanying social relations. The closing of the frontiers to primitive accumulation, through sheer exhaustion of possibilities, increasing resistance on the part of pre-capitalist populations, or monopolization by some dominant power, has, therefore, a tremendous significance for the long-run stability of capitalism. This was the sea-change that began to be felt increasingly as capitalism moved into the twentieth century. It was the sea-change that, far more than the rise of monopoly or finance forms of capitalism, played the crucial role in pushing capitalism deeper into the mire of global crises and led, inexorably, to the kinds of primitive accumulation and devaluation jointly wrought through inter-capitalist wars. The mechanisms, as always, are intricate in their details and greatly confused in actual historical conjunctures by innumerable cross-currents of conflicting forces. But we can construct a simple line of argument to illustrate the important points. Any regional alliance, if it is to continue the process of accumulation, must maintain access to reserves of labour as well as to those 'forces of nature' (such as key mineral resources) that are otherwise capable of monopolization. Few problems arise if reserves of both exist in the region wherein most local capital circulates. When internal frontiers close, capital has to look elsewhere or risk devaluation. The regional alliance feels the stress between capital embedded in place and capital that moves to create new and permanent centres of accumulation elsewhere. Conflict between different regional and national capitals over access to labour reserves and natural resources begins to be felt. The themes of internationalism and multilaterialism run hard up against the desire for autarky as the means to preserve the position of some particular region in the face of internal contradictions and external pressures - autarky of the sort that prevailed in the 193Os, as Britain sealed in its Commonwealth trade and Japan expanded into Manchuria and mainland Asia, Germany into eastern Europe and Italy into Africa, pitting different regions against each other, each pursuing its own 'spatial fix'. Only the United States found it appropriate to pursue an 'open door' policy founded on internationalism and multilateral trading. In the end the war was fought to contain autarky and to open up the whole world to the potentialities of geographical expansion and unlimited uneven development. That solution, pursued single-mindedly under United States's hegemony after 1945, had the advantage of being super-imposed upon one of the most savage bouts of devaluation and destruction ever recorded in capitalism's violent history. And signal benefits accrued not simply from the immense destruction of capital, but also from the uneven geographical distribution of that destruction. The world was saved from the terrors of the great depression not by some glorious 'new deal' or the magic touch of Keynesian economics in the treasuries of the world, but by the destruction and death of global war.

### 1nc

#### Interpretation - “United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### **Violation – the plan claims advantages external to the implementation of the plan**

#### **Voting issue for limits, ground, and plan focus - critical frameworks change the role of the ballot from a yes / no question to an infinite number of other frameworks – this allows them to claim advantages from any part of the debate and moots all ground by making consequences irrelevant**

### ethics

#### Do not evaluate their value system without first assessing the consequences of its actual implementation. Viewing ethics in isolation is irresponsible & complicit with the evil they criticize.

**Issac** **2002**.,( Jeffery C. Professor of political science at Indiana-Bloomington & Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life. PhD Yale University. From “Ends, Means, and Politics.” Dissent Magazine. Volume 49. Issue # 2. Available online @ subscribing institutions using Proquest. Herm

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Rejecting consequences undermines responsibility, freedom and politics

**Williams, 2005-** Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales (Michael, “the realist tradition and the limits of international relations”, p 174-176)

A commitment to an ethic of consequences reflects a deeper ethic of criticism, of ‘self-clarification’, and thus of reflection upon the values adopted by an individual or a collectivity. It is part of an attempt to make critical evaluation an intrinsic element of responsibility. Responsibility to this more fundamental ethic gives the ethic of consequences meaning. Consequentialism and responsibility are here drawn into what schluchter, in terms that will be familiar to anyone conversant with constructivism in international relations, has called a ‘reflexive principle’. Inthe wilful realist vision, scepticism and consequentialism are linked in an attempt to construct not just a more substantial vision of political responsibility, but also the kinds of actors who might adopt it, and the kinds of social structures that might support it. A consequentialist ethic is not simply a choice adopted by actors: it is a means of trying to foster particular kinds of self-critical individuals and societies, and in so doing to encourage a means by which one can justify and foster a politics of responsibility. The ethic of responsibility in wilful realism thus involves a commitment to both autonomy and limitation, to freedom and restraint, to an acceptance of limits and the criticism of limits. Responsibility clearly involves prudence and an accounting for current structures and their historical evolution; but it is not limited to this, for it seeks ultimately the creation of responsible subjects within a philosophy of limits. Seen in this light, the realist commitment to objectivity appears quite differently. Objectivity in terms of consequentialist analysis does not simply take the actor or action as given, it is a political practice — an attempt to foster a responsible self, undertaken by an analyst with a commitment to objectivity which is itself based in a desire to foster a politics of responsibility. Objectivity in the sense of coming to terms with the ‘reality’ of contextual conditions and likely outcomes of action is not only necessary for success, it is vital for self-reflection, for sustained engagement with the practical and ethical adequacy of one’s views. The blithe, self-serving, and uncritical stances of abstract moralism or rationalist objectivism avoid self-criticism by refusing to engage with the intractability of the world ‘as it is’. Reducing the world to an expression of their theoretical models, political platforms, or ideological programmes, they fail to engage with this reality, and thus avoid the process of self-reflection at the heart of responsibility. By contrast, realist objectivity takes an engagement with this intractable ‘object’ that is not reducible to one’s wishes or will as a necessary condition of ethical engagement, self-reflection, and self-creation.7 objectivity is not a naïve naturalism in the sense of scientific laws or rationalist calculation; it is a necessary engagement with a world that eludes one’s will. A recognition of the limits imposed by ‘reality’ is a condition for a recognition of one’s own limits — that the world is not simply an extension of one’s own will. But it is also a challenge to use that intractability as a source of possibility, as providing a set of openings within which a suitably chastened and yet paradoxically energised will to action can responsibly be pursued. In the wilful realist tradition, the essential opacity of both the self and the world are taken as limiting principles. Limits upon understanding provide chastening parameters for claims about the world and actions within it. But they also provide challenging and creative openings within which diverse forms of life can be developed: the limited unity of the self and the political order is the precondition for freedom. The ultimate opacity of the world is not to be despaired of: it is a condition of possibility for the wilful, creative construction of selves and social orders which embrace the diverse human potentialities which this lack of essential or intrinsic order makes possible.8 but it is also to be aware of the less salutary possibilities this involves. Indeterminacy is not synonymous with absolute freedom — it is both a condition of, and imperative toward, responsibility.

### advantage

#### Realism’s inevitable – interdisciplinary research proves

**Wohlforth 09** - William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

Mainstream theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo only when it has implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a state’s satisfaction [End Page 34] with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.24 By that assumption, once a state’s status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on decisions for war or peace. But the assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging from neuroscience and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.25 People often seek tangibles not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and/or prosperity.

#### The 1ac’s ethical insistence on the abolition of otherization produces a universal standard that all societies must conform to – this causes exclusion to resurface as it projects enemies to humanity, justifying total war and dehumanization.

**Odysseos 08,** Dr. Louiza Odysseos, University of Sussex Department of International Relations, “Against Ethics? Iconographies of Enmity and Acts of Obligation in Carl Schmitt’s Theory of the Partisan,” Practices of Ethics: Relating/Responding to Difference in International Politics Annual Convention, International Studies Association, 2008//MC

In The Concept of the Political Schmitt had already indicted the increased usage of the terminology of ‘humanity’ by both theorists and institutional actors such as the League of Nations (1996a). His initial critique allows us to illuminate four distinct criticisms against contemporary world politics’ ethical recourse to the discourse of humanity (cf. Odysseos 2007b). The first objection arises from the location of this discourse in the liberal universe of values. By using the discourse of humanity, the project of a universal ethics reverberates with the nineteenth century ‘ringing proclamations of disinterested liberal principle’ (Gowan 2003: 53) through which ‘liberalism quite successfully conceals its politics, which is the politics of getting rid of politics’ (Dyzenhaus 1998: 14). For Schmitt, the focus of liberal modernity on moral questions aims to ignore or surpass questions of conflict altogether: it is therefore ‘the battle against the political - as Schmitt defines the political’, in terms of the permanency of social antagonism in politics (Sax 2002: 501). The second criticism argues that ‘humanity is not a political concept, and no political entity corresponds to it. The eighteenth century humanitarian concept of humanity was a polemical denial of the then existing aristocratic feudal system and the privileges accompanying it’ (Schmitt 1996a: 55). Outside of this historical location, where does it find concrete expression but in the politics of a politically neutral ‘international community’ which acts, we are assured, in the interest of humanity? (cf. Blair 1999). The ‘international community is coextensive with humanity…[it]possesses the inherent right to impose its will…and to punish its violation, not because of a treaty, or a pact or a covenant, but because of an international need’, a need which it can only determine as the ‘secularized “church” of “common humanity”’ (Rasch 2003: 137, citing James Brown Scott).2 A third objection, still, has to do with the imposition of particular kind of monism: despite the lip-service to plurality, taken from the market (Kalyvas 1999), ‘liberal pluralism is in fact not in the least pluralist but reveals itself to be an overriding monism, the monism of humanity’ (Rasch 2003: 136). Similarly, current universalist perspectives, while praising ‘customary’ or cultural differences, think of them ‘but asethical or aesthetic material for a unified polychromatic culture – a new singularity born of a blending and merging of multiple local constituents’ (Brennan 2003: 41).One oft-discussed disciplining effect is that, politically, the ethics of a universal humanity shows little tolerance for what is regarded as ‘intolerant’ politics, which is any politics that moves in opposition to its ideals, rendering political opposition to it illegitimate (Rasch 2003: 136). This is compounded by the fact that liberal ethical discourses are also defined by a claim to their own exception and superiority. They naturalise the historical origins of liberal societies, which are no longer regarded as ‘contingently established and historically conditioned forms of organization’; rather, they ‘become the universal standard against which other societies are judged. Those found wanting are banished, as outlaws, from the civilized world. Ironically, one of the signs of their outlaw status is their insistence on autonomy, on sovereignty’ (ibid.:141; cf. Donnelly 1998). Most importantly, and related to this concern, there is the relation of the concept of humanity to ‘the other’, and to war and violence. In its historical location, the humanity concept had critical purchase against aristocratic prerogatives; yet its utilisation by liberal ethical discourses within a philosophy of an ‘absolute humanity’, Schmitt feared, could bring about new and unimaginable modes of exclusion (1996a,2003,2004/2007): By virtue of its universality and abstract normativity, it has no localizable polis, no clear distinction between what is inside and what is outside. Does humanity embrace all humans? Are there no gates to the city and thus no barbarians outside? If not, against whom or what does it wage its wars? (Rasch2003: 135). ‘Humanity as such’, Schmitt noted, ‘cannot wage war because it has no enemy’,(1996a: 54), indicating that humanity ‘is a polemical word that negates its opposite’ (Kennedy 1998: 94; emphasis added). In The Concept of the Political Schmitt argued that humanity ‘excludes the concept of the enemy, because the enemy does not cease to be a human being’ (1996a: 54). However, in his 1950 book with an international focus, The Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt noted how only when ‘man appeared to be the embodiment of absolute humanity, did the other side of this concept appear in the form of a new enemy: the inhuman’ (2003a: 104). It becomes apparent that, historically examined, the concept of humanity engenders a return to a ‘discriminatory concept of war’, by which Schmitt meant that it reintroduces the legitimacy and need for substantive causes of justice in war (Schmitt 2003b: 37-52). This in turn disallows the notion of justus hostis, of a ‘just enemy’ – explored in section three – associated with the notion of non-discriminatory interstate war which took the shape of guerreen for me (Schmitt 2003a: 142-144). The concept of humanity, therefore, shatters the formal concept of justus hostis, allowing the enemy to now be designated substantively as an enemy of humanity as such. This leaves the enemy of humanity with no value and open to dehumanisation and political and physical annihilation (Schmitt 2004: 67). In discussing the League of Nations, Schmitt highlights that, compared to the kinds of wars that can be waged on behalf of humanity, the interstate European wars from 1815 to 1914 in reality were regulated; they were bracketed by the neutral Great Powers and were completely legal procedures in comparison with the modern and gratuitous police actions against violators of peace, which can be dreadful acts of annihilation (Schmitt2003a: 186). Enemies of humanity cannot be considered ‘just and equal’. Moreover, they cannot claim neutrality: one cannot remain neutral in the call to be for or against humanity or its freedom; one cannot, similarly, claim a right to resist or defend oneself, in the sense we understand this right to have existed in the international law of Europe (the jus publicum Europeaum). Such a denial of self-defence and resistance ‘can presage a dreadful nihilistic destruction of all law’ (ibid.: 187). When the enemy is not accorded a procedural justice and formal equality, the notion that peace can be made with him is unacceptable, as Schmitt detailed through his study of the League of Nations, which had declared the abolition of war, but in rescinding the concept of neutrality only succeeded in the ‘dissolution of “peace”’ (ibid.: 246). It is with the dissolution of peace that total wars of annihilation become possible, where ‘the other’ cannot be assimilated, or accommodated, let alone tolerated: the friend/enemy distinction is not longer taking place with a justus hostis but rather between good and evil, human and in human, where ‘the negative pole of the distinction is to be fully and finally consumed without remainder’ (Rasch 2003: 137). Finally, the ethical discourse of a universal humanity can be discerned in the tendency to normalise diverse peoples through legalisation and individualisation. The paramount emphasis placed on legal instruments and entitlements such as human rights transforms diverse subjectivities into ‘rights-holders’. ‘[T]he other is stripped of his otherness and made to conform to the universal ideal of what it means to be human’, meaning that ‘the term “human” is not descriptive, but evaluative. To be truly human, one needs to be corrected’ (Rasch 2003: 140 and 137; cf. Young 2002;Hopgood 2000). What does this correction in its ‘multiform tactics’, which include Michel Foucault’s proper terms of discipline and training, aim to produce? The answer may well be the proper, free (masterful), equal and rational (in its self-interest)subject of rights, of capitalism and the governmentalised state (Foucault 2001a). As Gil Anidjar notes, the operation of the traditional binary ‘sovereign/enemy’ is transformed ‘in the disciplinary society (which signals, according to Foucault, the dissolution of sovereign power) into “disciplinary regime/criminality” (or, for that second term, legal subject, subject of the law, and, of course, “man”)’ (Anidjar 2004:42; emphasis added). Of equally great importance is transformation that follows in the transition from a disciplinary to a governmental economy of power: this is what we are at the moment confronting and must analyse: what are the paths towards which the other as enemy is directed by (a global) governmentality and, moreover, what forms, subjectivities, etc., is the ‘enemy’ encouraged to take in the form of an unavoidable freedom, along the lines articulated by Foucault under the heading of ‘self government’(2007b).

#### Embracing the call for ethics through the lens of enmity is critical to a reflexive political identity – only rejecting the obligation to the Other prevents annihilation of difference and unending violence.

**Odysseos 08,** Dr. Louiza Odysseos, University of Sussex Department of International Relations, “Against Ethics? Iconographies of Enmity and Acts of Obligation in Carl Schmitt’s Theory of the Partisan,” Practices of Ethics: Relating/Responding to Difference in International Politics Annual Convention, International Studies Association, 2008//MC

The paper ends with a discussion of obligation. Outlining the contours of a notion of political, rather, than ethical obligation, however, may require some explicit distancing from the now-familiar accounts that have oriented critical ‘ethical’ endeavours for some time. So we ask again the ethical question which has haunted us: from whence does obligation originate? Were we to be still enthralled by a Levinasian or generally any ‘other-beholden’ thought of being ‘hostage’ to the other, we might say that the face to face encounter installs obligation before representation, knowledge and other ‘Greek’ relationalities (Levinas 1989: 76–77; Odysseos 2007a: 132-151).Caputo, however, warns us off this kind of commitment to a notion of perfectible or total obligation. He asks that we recognise that ‘one is always inside/outside obligation, on its margins. On the threshold of foolishness. Almost a perfect fool for the Other. But not quite; nothing is perfect’ (1993: 126). The laudable but impossible perfectibility of ethics and ethical obligation to the other must be rethought. This is because ‘one is hostage of the Other, but one also keeps an army, just in case’ (ibid.).Caputo is not speaking as a political realist in this apparently funny comment. He is pointing, I suggest, to the centrality of politics and enmity. Obligation is not to the other alone; it is also to the radical possibility of openness of political order, which allows self and other to be ‘determined otherwise’ (Prozorov 2007a). Analytically, we also want to know the tactics and subjective effects of being directed towards enforced freedom. In this way, we might articulate a political and concrete act obligation that is inextricably tied to freedom that is not ‘enforced’, that is not produced for us, or as ‘us’.With Schmitt, one might say that obligation points practically (i.e. politically) to the‘relativisation of enmity’. Obligation may not, however, be towards the enemy as such, for the enemy is the pulse of the political – so long as the enemy is relative (yet can be killed) in the order, the openness of the order can be vouched safe in the disruption of the absolutism of its immanence (Ojakangas 2007; Schmitt 1995a). We might, then, recast Schmitt’s conception of the political (which he regards as coming into being in the decision which distinguishes between friend and enemy) through his later emphasis in Theory of the Partisan on the politically normative significance of the relativisation of enmity. In other words, we might say that what needs to remain possible is the constant struggle ‘between constituent and constituted power’(Beasley-Murray 2005: 221) in both society and also world order.It is important to identify the ethical and governmental project of enforced freedom because doing so allows us to think of obligation as related to a different freedom: freedom as resistance (not freedom as an attribute). Prozorov suggests that an ‘ontology of concrete freedom’ relies on ‘freedom of potentiality of being other wise’,of being able to ‘to assert one’s power as a living being against the power, whose paradigm consists in the “care of the living”’ (2007a: 210-211). This assumes, however, first, that resistance lies in the ‘refusal of biopolitical care that affirms the sovereign power of bare life’ ((Prozorov 2007a: 20) and, second, that there is a sort of ‘radical freedom of the human being that precedes governmental care’ (Prozorov2007a: 110). I argue in conclusion, however, that freedom as resistance is still too limited; it may still be, despite all attempts, lured back to a thinking of an essence: of that prior state of pre-governmental production of subjectivity, which in actuality does not exist. Rather, Foucault’s brief intervention on the issue of obligation (2001b) through the International Committee against Piracy points to ‘a radically interdependent relationship with practices of governmentality’ (Campbell 1998: 516) to which we are all subjected, here understood in the proper Greek sense of our subjectivity being predicated on governmental practice (cf. Odysseos 2007a: 4). ‘We are all members of the community of the governed and thereby obliged to show mutual solidarity’, Foucault had argued, as against obligation understood within modern humanism (Foucault 2001b: 474; emphasis added). This obligation which he invokes simply exists (es gibt), as Heidegger might say. We would add that Schmitt’s account of the transition from ‘real’ to ‘absolute’ enmity in the twentieth century and his demand that ‘the enemy is not something to be eliminated out of a particular reason, something to be annihilated as worthless..’ must be read in this way (Schmitt2004: 61): as speaking for the need to ward off the shutting down of politics. That is why Schmitt’s two iconographies rest precisely on two extremes: the mythic narratives of an order open to enmity as its exteriority, which guarantees pluriversal openness, on the one hand, and the absolute immanence of order where ‘absolute enmity driv[es] the political universe’ on the other hand (Goodson 2004b: 151).This is a notion of a world-political obligation that ‘is a kind of *skandalon* for ethics, which makes ethics blush, which it must reject or expel in order to maintain its good name…’ (Caputo 1993: 5). This obligation is articulated for the openness that enmity brings; it attends to the other as enemy by allowing, against ethics, for the continued but changeable structurations of the field of politics, of politics as pluriverse.

### epist

#### Discourse doesn’t shape reality – 4 reasons.

**Peabody and Roskoski ’91 -** joe and matthew, fsu, “a linguistic and philosophical critique of language ‘arguments’”, http://debate.uvm.edu/library/debatetheorylibrary/roskoski&peabody-langcritiques)

One reason for the hypothesis being taken for granted is that on first glance it seems intuitively valid to some. However, after research is conducted it becomes clear that this intuition is no longer true. Rosch notes that the hypothesis "not only does not appear to be empirically true in any major respect, but it no longer even seems profoundly and ineffably true" (Rosch 276). The implication for language "arguments" is clear: a debater must do more than simply read cards from feminist or critical scholars that say language creates reality. Instead, the debater must support this claim with empirical studies or other forms of scientifically valid research. Mere intuition is not enough, and it is our belief that valid empirical studies do not support the hypothesis. After assessing the studies up to and including 1989, Takano claimed that the hypothesis "has no empirical support" (Takano 142). Further, Miller & McNeill claim that "nearly all" of the studies performed on the Whorfian hypothesis "are best regarded as efforts to substantiate the weak version of the hypothesis" (Miller & McNeill 734). We additionally will offer four reasons the hypothesis is not valid. The first reason is that it is impossible to generate empirical validation for the hypothesis. Because the hypothesis is so metaphysical and because it relies so heavily on intuition it is difficult if not impossible to operationalize. Rosch asserts that "profound and ineffable truths are not, in that form, subject to scientific investigation" (Rosch 259). We concur for two reasons. The first is that the hypothesis is phrased as a philosophical first principle and hence would not have an objective referent. The second is there would be intrinsic problems in any such test. The independent variable would be the language used by the subject. The dependent variable would be the subject's subjective reality. The problem is that the dependent variable can only be measured through self- reporting, which - naturally - entails the use of language. Hence, it is impossible to separate the dependent and independent variables. In other words, we have no way of knowing if the effects on "reality" are actual or merely artifacts of the language being used as a measuring tool. The second reason that the hypothesis is flawed is that there are problems with the causal relationship it describes. Simply put, it is just as plausible (in fact infinitely more so) that reality shapes language. Again we echo the words of Dr. Rosch, who says: {C}ovariation does not determine the direction of causality. On the simplest level, cultures are very likely to have names for physical objects which exist in their culture and not to have names for objects outside of their experience. Where television sets exists, there are words to refer to them. However, it would be difficult to argue that the objects are caused by the words. The same reasoning probably holds in the case of institutions and other, more abstract, entities and their names. (Rosch 264). The color studies reported by Cole & Means tend to support this claim (Cole & Means 75). Even in the best case scenario for the Whorfians, one could only claim that there are causal operations working both ways - i.e. reality shapes language and language shapes reality. If that was found to be true, which at this point it still has not, the hypothesis would still be scientifically problematic because "we would have difficulty calculating the extent to which the language we use determines our thought" (Schultz 134). The third objection is that the hypothesis self- implodes. If language creates reality, then different cultures with different languages would have different realities. Were that the case, then meaningful cross- cultural communication would be difficult if not impossible. In Au's words: "it is never the case that something expressed in Zuni or Hopi or Latin cannot be expressed at all in English. Were it the case, Whorf could not have written his articles as he did entirely in English" (Au 156). The fourth and final objection is that the hypothesis cannot account for single words with multiple meanings. For example, as Takano notes, the word "bank" has multiple meanings (Takano 149). If language truly created reality then this would not be possible. Further, most if not all language "arguments" in debate are accompanied by the claim that intent is irrelevant because the actual rhetoric exists apart from the rhetor's intent. If this is so, then the Whorfian advocate cannot claim that the intent of the speaker distinguishes what reality the rhetoric creates. The prevalence of such multiple meanings in a debate context is demonstrated with every new topicality debate, where debaters spend entire rounds quibbling over multiple interpretations of a few words.1

#### Epistemological debate is irrelevant and concrete action is inevitable – pragmatism is key to useful knowledge

**Friedrichs, 09** [Jorg, University Lecturer in Politics at the Oxford Department of International Development, “From Positivist Pretense to Pragmatic Practice Varieties of Pragmatic Methodology in IR Scholarship” Pragmatism and International Relations]

As Friedrich Nietzsche ([1887] 1994:1; cf. Wilson 2002) knew, the knower isstrangely unknown to himself. In fact, it is much more hazardous to contemplate the way how we gain knowledge than to gain such knowledge in the ﬁrst place.This is not to deny that intellectuals are a narcissistic Kratochwil lot, with a penchant for omphaloskepsis. The typical result of theirnavel-gazing, however, is not increased self-awareness. Scholars are more likely to come up with ex-post-facto rationalizations of how they would like to see their activity than with accurate descriptions of how they go about business. As a result, in science there is a paradoxical divide between positivist pretenseand pragmatic practice. Many prominent scholars proceed pragmatically in gen-erating their knowledge, only to vest it all in a positivist cloak when it comes topresenting results. In the wake of Karl Popper (1963), fantasies about ingeniousconjectures and inexorable refutations continue to hold sway despite the muchmore prosaic way most scholars grope around in the formulation of their theo-ries, and the much less rigorous way they assess the value of their hypotheses. In proposing pragmatism as a more realistic alternative to positivist idealiza-tions, I am not concerned with the original intentions of Charles Peirce. Theseare discussed and enhanced by Ryto¨ vuori-Apunen (this forum). Instead, Ipresent various attempts to make pragmatism work as a methodology for IR scholarship. This includes my own preferred methodology, the pragmaticresearch strategy of abduction. As Fritz Kratochwil and I argue elsewhere,abduction should be at the center of our efforts, while deduction and induction areimportant but auxiliary tools (Friedrichs and 2009).Of course, one does not need to be a pragmatist to proceed in a pragmatic way. Precisely because it is derived from practice, pragmatic commonsense is a sold as the hills. For example, James Rosenau (1988:164) declared many yearsago that he coveted ‘‘a long-held conviction that one advances knowledge most effectively by continuously moving back and forth between very abstract and very empirical levels of inquiry, allowing the insights of the former to exert pressurefor the latter even as the ﬁndings of the latter, in turn, exert pressure for the for-mer, thus sustaining an endless cycle in which theory and research feed on eachother.’’ This was shortly before Rosenau’s turn to postmodernism, while he wasstill touting the virtues of behaviorism and standard scientiﬁc requisites, such asindependent and dependent variables and theory testing. But if we take his state-ment at face value, it appears that Rosenau-the-positivist was guided by a sort of pragmatism for all but the name. While such practical commonsense is certainly valuable, in and by itself, it does not qualify as scientiﬁc methodology. Science requires a higher degree of methodological awareness. For this reason, I am not interested here in pragma-tism as unspoken commonsense, or as a pretext for doing empirical researchunencumbered by theoretical and methodological considerations. Nor am I con-cerned with pragmatism as an excuse for staging yet another epistemological debate. Instead, I am interested in pragmatism as an instrument to go about research with an appropriate degree of epistemological and methodologicalawareness. Taking this criterion as my yardstick, the following three varieties of pragmatist methodology in recent IR scholarship are worth mentioning: theory synthesis, analytic eclecticism (AE), and abduction.Theory synthesis is proposed by Andrew Moravcsik (2003), who claims that theories can be combined as long as they are compatible at some unspeciﬁedfundamental level, and that data will help to identify the right combination of theories. He does not explicitly invoke pragmatism but vests his pleading in apositivist cloak by using the language of theory testing. When looking closer,however, it becomes apparent that his theoretical and methodological noncha-lance is far more pragmatic than what his positivist rhetoric suggests. Moravcsiksees himself in good company, dropping the following names: Robert Keohane,Stephen Walt, Jack Snyder, Stephen Van Evera, Bary Buzan, Bruce Russett, John O’Neal, Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink. With the partial excep-tion of Finnemore, however, none of these scholars explicitly links his or herscholarship to pragmatism. They employ pragmatic commonsense in theirresearch, but devoutly ignore pragmatism as a philosophical and methodologicalposition. As a result, it is fair to say that theory synthesis is only on a slightly higher level of intellectual awareness than Rosenau’s statement quoted above. Analytic eclecticism, as advertized by Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, links acommonsensical approach to empirical research with a more explicit commit-ment to pragmatism (Sil and Katzenstein 2005; Katzenstein and Sil 2008).The 7 Even the dean of critical rationalism, Karl Popper, is ‘‘guilty’’ of lapses into pragmatism, for example when hestates that scientists, like hungry animals, classify objects according to needs and interests, although with the impor-tant difference that they are guided in their quest for ﬁnding regularities not so much by the stomach but ratherby empirical problems and epistemic interests (Popper 1963:61–62). 646 Pragmatism and International Relations idea is to combine existing research traditions in a pragmatic fashion and thusto enable the formulation and exploration of novel and more complex sets of problems. The constituent elements of different research traditions are trans-lated into mutually compatible vocabularies and then recombined in novel ways.This implies that most scholars must continue the laborious process of formulat-ing parochial research traditions so that a few cosmopolitan colleagues will beenabled to draw upon their work and construct syncretistic collages. 8 In additionto themselves, Katzenstein and Sil cite a number of like-minded scholars such asCharles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Paul Pierson, and Robert Jervis. 9 The ascription isprobably correct given the highly analytical and eclectic approach of these schol-ars. Nevertheless, apart from Katzenstein and Sil themselves none of these schol-ars has explicitly avowed himself to AE.My preferred research strategy is abduction, which is epistemologically asself-aware as AE but minimizes the dependence on existing research traditions.The typical situation for abduction is when we, both in everyday life and as socialscientists, become aware of a certain class of phenomena that interests us for somereason, but for which we lack applicable theories. We simply trust, although we donot know for certain, that the observed class of phenomena is not random. Wetherefore start collecting pertinent observations and, at the same time, applyingconcepts from existing ﬁelds of our knowledge. Instead of trying to impose anabstract theoretical template (deduction) or ‘‘simply’’ inferring propositions fromfacts (induction), we start reasoning at an intermediate level (abduction). Abduction follows the predicament that science is, or should be, above all amore conscious and systematic version of the way by which humans have learnedto solve problems and generate knowledge in their everyday lives. As it iscurrently practiced, science is often a poor emulator of what we are able toachieve in practice. This is unfortunate because human practice is the ultimatemiracle. In our own practice, most of us manage to deal with many challenging situations.The way we accomplish this is completely different from, and far moreefﬁcient than, the way knowledge is generated according to standard scientiﬁc methods. If it is true that in our own practice we proceed not so much by induction or deduction but rather by abduction, then science would do well tomimic this at least in some respects. 10 Abduction has been invoked by numerous scholars, including Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie, Jeffrey Checkel, Martin Shapiro, Alec Stone Sweet, andMartha Finnemore. While they all use the term abduction, none has ever thor-oughly speciﬁed its meaning. To make up for this omission, I have developedabduction into an explicit methodology and applied it in my own research oninternational police cooperation (Friedrichs 2008). Unfortunately, it is impossi-ble to go into further detail here. Readers interested in abduction as a way toadvance international research and methodology can also be referred to my recent article with Fritz Kratochwil (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009).On a ﬁnal note, we should be careful not to erect pragmatism as the ultimateepistemological fantasy to caress the vanity of Nietzschean knowers unknown tothemselves, namely that they are ingeniously ‘‘sorting out’’ problematic situa-tions. Scientiﬁc inquiry is not simply an intimate encounter between a researchproblem and a problem solver. It is a social activity taking place in communitiesof practice (Wenger 1998). Pragmatism must be neither reduced to the utility of results regardless of their social presuppositions and meaning, nor to the 8 Pace Rudra Sil (this forum), the whole point about eclecticism is that you rely on existing traditions to blendthem into something new. There is no eclecticism without something to be eclectic about. 9 One may further expand the list by including the international society approach of the English school (Ma-kinda 2000), as well as the early Kenneth Waltz (1959). 10 Precisely for this reason, abduction understood as ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ plays a crucial role inthe ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence. 647 The Forum fabrication of consensus among scientists. Pragmatism as the practice of dis-cursive communitiesand pragmatism as a device for the generation of useful knowledge are two sides of the same coin

# 2nc

#### Engagement requires sustained government-to-government interaction

**Sheen, 2** – associate professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University (Seongho, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Spring 2002, “US Strategy of Engagement During the Cold War and Its Implication for Sunshine Policy” <http://www.kida.re.kr/data/2006/04/14/seongho_sheen.pdf>)

Can the sunshine policy really bring positive changes within the North Korean regime and peace to the Korean peninsula? The logic behind Kim Dae-jung’s policy is a refinement of one of the major strategies of economic statecraft and military competition. In his discussion of US economic statecraft towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Michael Mastanduno provides a useful framework for understanding President Kim’s engagement policy towards the North. In general, engagement promotes positive relations with an enemy as a means of changing the behavior or policies of a target government. It accepts the legitimacy of that government and tries to shape its conduct. Engagement also requires the establishment and continuance of political communication with the target. In engaging the enemy, the state sees political polarization with target or isolation of the target country as undesirable.

#### Engagement towards a government must be conditional, the plan isn’t.

**Haass and O’Sullivan, 2k** - \*Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution AND \*\*a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (Richard and Meghan, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies” Survival,, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf>

Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged, the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges, such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is geared towards a government; unconditional engagement works with a country’s civil society or private sector in the hopes of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation.

#### Venezuelan oil investment would meet

De Cordoba and Munoz 13 (1/11/2013, JOSÉ DE CÓRDOBA and SARA MUÑOZ, “Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend Ties,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html, JMP)

"It will be very slow, very difficult, but I think Maduro would be inclined to open up a little bit," said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington think tank. Mr. Shifter said the subjects of drug-trafficking and terrorism remain "very sensitive, delicate issues, and there is a lot of mistrust that isn't going to be easily overcome." greater cooperation between the two countries could come from the private sector. With Venezuela's oil production in decline, giving the government less power to spend its way out of a likely recession, successors may be more willing to reopen its border once again to U.S. investment than it was under Mr. Chávez, who expanded state control over parts of the oil sector.

#### So would Mexican renewables

**Barber 11** – Editor @ Energy Trend

(DA, “Mexico’s Emerging Solar Market,” http://pv.energytrend.com/research/Mexico\_Emerging\_Solar\_Market.html)//BB

Today, solar power in Mexico amounts to less than 1 percent of Mexico's total energy production, meaning utility-scale solar power is not only in its infancy, it is a huge opportunity.

But entry into the Mexican solar industry market has specific hurdles. Mexican utilities are state-owned, making it difficult for independent power providers (IPPs) to enter the market, which includes power generation, transmission and distribution controlled by the government’s Federal Commission of Electricity (CFE). This means any development of the solar industry requires government backing. But the last few years has seen some progress: IPPs are now permitted to sell power to CFE for the industrial use, and corporations can produce electricity up to 30 MW for their own use. Though any surplus power can be sold to the state-owned national grid, the lucrative residential solar power market remains totally under state control.

#### And so would normalizing trade relations with Cuba

**French 9** – editor of and a frequent contributor to The Havana Note. She has led more than two dozen research trips to Cuba (Anya, “Options for Engagement A Resource Guide for Reforming U.S. Policy toward Cuba” <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Cuba/USPolicy/options-for-engagement.pdf>)

the path to “normal” trade relations If the United States were to lift its trade embargo against Cuba, this would not automatically confer “normal” status to the bilateral trade relationship. It would mean that the United States and Cuba have the opportunity to begin trading in more goods and services than they have in the last fifty years. Whether much expanded trade actually occurs depends on whether the United States were to take additional steps beyond lifting the embargo: the most important of which is the provision of Normal Trade Relations (NTR). NTR is a technical term which refers to the provision of nondiscriminatory treatment toward trading partners. Cuba and North Korea are the only two countries to which the United States continues to deny “normal trade relations.” All other countries either have permanent normal trade relations or temporary, renewable normal trade relations with the United States.161 Assuming that the Cuba-specific trade sanctions contained in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (the continuity of which was codified by the 1996 Helms-Burton Act) were to be eliminated, achieving normal trade relations between Cuba and the United States would not be a simple matter. A first stumbling block could be the 1974 Trade Act provision dubbed “Jackson-Vanik,” which prohibits non-market economy countries from receiving normal tariff treatment, entering into a bilateral commercial agreement, or receiving any U.S. government credits or loan guarantees, until the President has reported to Congress that such a country does not: 1) deny its citizens the right to emigrate, 2) impose an unreasonable tax or fine for emigrating, and 3) impose more than a “nominal tax, levy, fine, fee or other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice.”162 Thus, Cuba’s restrictions on its citizens’ emigration rights pose an obstacle to normalization of bilateral trade. Only once the requirements set forth by the Jackson-Vanik amendment have been met, (and absent any other Cuba-specific sanctions, such as the Export Administration Act controls on countries found to be supporting international terrorism), could the United States begin negotiations of a bilateral commercial agreement with Cuba. To begin to extend normal trade relations to Cuba, the United States would need to enter into a reciprocal trade agreement with Cuba (not equivalent to a “free trade agreement”) that would provide a balance of trade benefits and protections to U.S. exports and commercial entities doing business with Cuba, at the same time it would provide such benefits to Cuba. Such an agreement would need to include protection for U.S. patents and trademarks and for “industrial rights and processes,” include a safeguard mechanism to prevent market disruptions due to trade, and provide that the agreement, and its continuation, be subject to the national security interests of both parties.163 Assuming bilateral relations had reached the appropriate milestones to begin discussing two-way trade, negotiating such an agreement could potentially take years, as both countries would need to adopt statutory and regulatory changes.

#### Precision is key to effective policy analysis

**Resnik, 1** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” v54, n2, political science complete)

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.¶ The refined definition I propose as a substitute for existing descriptions of engagement is different in two important ways: First, it clarifies the menu of choices available for policymakers by allowing engagement to be distinguished from related approaches such as appeasement, containment and isolation. Second, it lays the groundwork for systematic and objective research on historical cases of engagement in order to discern the conditions under which it can be used effectively. Such research will, in turn, help policymakers acquire the information necessary to better manage the rogue states of the 21st century.

# 1nr

#### The turn is unique – War on Terror resources are being cutback now – only the aff reinscribes the spread of imperialism

**Tourangbam 13** – (Monish, Eurasia Review, 6/29/13, <http://www.eurasiareview.com/29062013-rethinking-us-counter-terrorism-policy-analysis-2/>) //RGP

Close to 12 years after the 9/11 attacks that led to the global war on terror, and defined the landscape of US foreign policy and national security strategy, President Barack Obama delivered a landmark speech, seeking to reorient US counter-terrorism policy. Speaking at the National Defense University in Washington D.C. Obama outlined a comprehensive strategy that aimed at trimming down the predominance that counter-terrorism had occupied in US policymaking. This has been timed with the continuing drawdown of US forces in Afghanistan, a process that, by the end of 2014, would transfer combat responsibilities to Afghan forces, committing the residual US forces to only a training and advisory role, albeit, stationing some special operations forces to make sure that the Al Qaeda is never again able to attack the US homeland. The speech also made public Obama’s intention to scale down the drone campaign, subject it to tighter scrutiny and oversight, and recommit his second term to finally closing the controversial Guantanamo Bay prison facility. As such, this new realignment in US counter-terrorism policy is an attempt to gauge the evolving nature of threats to the United States, and respond with a proportionate use of force. Obama acknowledged continuing threats from terrorists, both external and home-grown, but he did not consider them an existential threat, thus accounting for the reassessment necessary in how the US responded to them. He used the occasion to make it clear that the operation undertaken to kill Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad was one-of-a-kind and not the norm, given the risks involved and the negative repercussions it had for US-Pakistan relations.

I discuss the incidents of state terrorism that are assessed in subsequent¶ chapters and show why they are defined as such.¶ Chapter 3 provides the historical context for the subsequent analysis of state¶ terrorism as a tool in the service of the foreign policies of great powers from the¶ North. To understand state terrorism as a tool of foreign policy, we must first¶ establish the objectives that such tools are intended to serve, and the strategies¶ used to achieve those objectives. I therefore outline the continuities at the heart of¶ the foreign policy objectives of the great Northern powers, dating back to colonial¶ times. In the colonial period, the European powers were driven by the aim of¶ acquiring territory in order to increase their global presence and dominance and¶ to secure access to resources in the interests of economic elites, and used coercion¶ widely, including terrorism, to achieve this. Those practices were also emulated¶ in early American imperialism. While contemporary Northern powers do¶ not seek to expand their territory, they still seek to maintain their power¶ economically, politically, militarily and ideologically. One way in which to do¶ this is to increase and sustain their access to and control of resources and markets¶ in the South, a process that is led by the US. The chapter demonstrates that efforts¶ to neoliberalise the South are intended to ensure that states in the South are¶ opened up so that multinational corporations, largely headquartered in the North,¶ can increase their market share, and thereby the wealth of Northern elites.¶ Chapter 4 explores the ways in which liberal democratic states from the North¶ used and sponsored state terrorism in the South in the twentieth century, up until¶ the end of the Cold War. In the cases of the former European colonial powers,¶ this was often part of the process of attempting to thwart decolonisation. I show¶ that the strategic aerial bombardment of German cities by allied forces during the¶ Second World War also constituted state terrorism.

#### The ecological crunch is coming --- overwhelming scientific evidence proves it risks extinction

**Shearman 7,** David, Emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, Secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an Independent Assessor on the IPCC; and Joseph Wayne Smith, lawyer and philosopher with a research interest in environmentalism, 2007, The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, p. 4-6

This impending crisis is caused by the accelerating damage to the natural environment on which humans depend for their survival. This is not to deny that there are other means that may bring catastrophe upon the earth. John Gray for example5 argues that destructive war is inevitable as nations become locked into the struggle for diminishing resources. Indeed, Gray believes that war is caused by the same instinctual behavior that we discuss in relation to environmental destruction. Gray regards population increases, environmental degradation, and misuse of technology as part of the inevitability of war. War may be inevitable but it is unpredictable in time and place, whereas environmental degradation is relentless and has progressively received increasing scientific evidence. Humanity has a record of doomsayers, most invariably wrong, which has brought a justifiable immunity to their utterances. Warnings were present in The Tales of Ovid and in the Old and New Testaments of the Bible, and in more recent times some of the predictions from Thomas Malthus and from the Club of Rome in 1972, together with the “population bomb” of Paul Ehrlich, have not eventuated. The frequent apocalyptic predictions from the environmental movement are unpopular and have been vigorously attacked. So it must be asked, what is different about the present warnings? As one example, when Sir David King, chief scientist of the UK government, states that “in my view, climate change is the most severe problem that we are facing today, more serious than the threat of terrorism,”6 how is this and other recent statements different from previous discredited prognostications? Firstly, they are based on the most detailed and compelling science produced with the same scientific rigor that has seen humans travel to the moon and create worldwide communication systems. Secondly, this science embraces a range of disciplines of ecology, epidemiology, climatology, marine and fresh water science, agricultural science, and many more, all of which agree on the nature and severity of the problems. Thirdly, there is virtual unanimity of thousands of scientists on the grave nature of these problems. Only a handful of skeptics remain. During the past decade many distinguished scientists, including numerous Nobel Laureates, have warned that humanity has perhaps one or two generations to act to avoid global ecological catastrophe. As but one example of this multidimensional problem, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has warned that global warming caused by fossil fuel consumption may be accelerating.7 Yet climate change is but one of a host of interrelated environmental problems that threaten humanity. The authors have seen the veils fall from the eyes of many scientists when they examine all the scientific literature. They become advocates for a fundamental change in society. The frequent proud statements on economic growth by treasurers and chancellors of the exchequer instill in many scientists an immediate sense of danger, for humanity has moved one step closer to doom. Science underpins the success of our technological and comfortable society. Who are the thousands of scientists who issue the warnings we choose to ignore? In 1992 the Royal Society of London and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences issued a joint statement, Population Growth, Resource Consumption and a Sustainable World,8 pointing out that the environmental changes affecting the planet may irreversibly damage the earth’s capacity to maintain life and that humanity’s own efforts to achieve satisfactory living conditions were threatened by environmental deterioration. Since 1992 many more statements by world scientific organizations have been issued.9 These substantiated that most environmental systems are suffering from critical stress and that the developed countries are the main culprits. It was necessary to make a transition to economies that provide increased human welfare and less consumption of energy and materials. It seems inconceivable that the consensus view of all these scientists could be wrong. There have been numerous international conferences of governments, industry groups, and environmental groups to discuss the problems and develop strategy, yet widespread deterioration of the environment accelerates. What is the evidence? The Guide to World Resources, 2000 –2001: People and Ecosystems, The Fraying Web of Life10 was a joint report of the United Nations Development Program, the United Nations Environment Program, the World Bank, and the World Resources Institute. The state of the world’s agricultural, coastal forest, freshwater, and grassland ecosystems were analyzed using 23 criteria such as food production, water quantity, and biodiversity. Eighteen of the criteria were decreasing, and one had increased (fiber production, because of the destruction of forests). The report card on the remaining four criteria was mixed or there was insufficient data to make a judgment. In 2005, The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Synthesis Report by 1,360 scientific experts from 95 countries was released.11 It stated that approximately 60 percent of the ecosystem services that support life on earth—such as fresh water, fisheries, and the regulation of air, water, and climate—are being degraded or used unsustainably. As a result the Millennium Goals agreed to by the UN in 2000 for addressing poverty and hunger will not be met and human well-being will be seriously affected.

#### That means eco-authoritarianism is coming now and prevents extinction, but the aff’s promotion of democracy ensures that it fails.

**Humphrey 7 -** Mathew, Reader in Political Philosophy at the University of Nottingham, UK, 2007, Ecological Politics and Democratic Theory: The Challenge to the Deliberative Ideal, p. 14-15

In terms of the first of these points, that our democratic choices reflect a narrow understanding of our immediate interests and not an enlightened view of our long-term welfare, the case is made by Ophuls. He claims that we are now 'so committed to most of the things that cause or support the evils' with which he is concerned that 'we are almost paralysed; nearly all the constructive actions that could be taken at present... are so painful to so many people in so many ways that they are indeed totally unrealistic, and neither politicians nor citizens would tolerate them' (Ophuls, 1977: 224).4 Environmentally friendly policies can be justifiably imposed upon a population that 'would do something quite different if it was merely left to its own immediate desires and devices' (Ophuls, 1977: 227): currently left to these devices, the American people 'have so far evinced little willingness to make even minor sacrifices... for the sake of environmental goals' (Ophuls, 1977: 197). Laura Westra makes a similar argument in relation to the collapse of Canadian cod fisheries, which is taken to illustrate a wider point that we cannot hope to 'manage' nature when powerful economic and political interests are supported by 'uneducated democratic preferences and values' (Westra, 1998: 95). More generally reducing our 'ecological footprint' means 'individual and aggregate restraints the like of which have not been seen in most of the northwestern world. For this reason, it is doubtful that persons will freely embrace the choices that would severely curtail their usual freedoms and rights... even in the interests of long-term health and self-preservation.” (Westra, 1998: 198). Thus we will require a 'top-down' regulatory regime to take on 'the role of the "wise man" of Aristotelian doctrine as well as 'bottom-up' shifts in values (Westra, 1998: 199). Ophuls also believes that in certain circumstances (of which ecological crisis is an example) 'democracy must give way to elite rule' (1977: 159) as critical decisions have to be made by competent people. The classic statement of the collective action problem in relation to environmental phenomena was that of Hardin (1968). The 'tragedy' here refers to the "remorseless working of things' towards an 'inevitable destiny' (Hardin, 1968: 1244, quoting A. N. Whitehead). Thus even if we are aware of where our long-term, enlightened interests do lie, the preferred outcome is beyond our ability to reach in an uncoerced manner. This is the n-person prisoners' dilemma, a well established analytical tool in the social analysis of collectively suboptimal outcomes. A brief example could be given in terms of an unregulated fishery. The owner of trawler can be fully aware that there is collective over-extraction from the fishing grounds he uses, and so the question arises of whether he should self-regulate his own catch. If he fishes to his maximum capacity, his gain is a catch fractionally depleted from what it would be if the fisheries were fully stocked. If the 'full catch' is 1, then this catch is 1 - £, where £ is the difference between the full stock catch and the depleted stock catch divided by the number of fishing vessels. If the trawlerman regulates his own catch, then he loses the entire amount that he feels each boat needs to surrender, and furthermore he has no reason to suppose that other fishermen would behave in a similar fashion, in fact he will expect them to benefit by catching the fish that he abjures. In the language of game theory he would be a 'sucker', and the rational course of action is to continue taking the maximum catch, despite the predictable conclusion that this course of action, when taken by all fishermen making the same rational calculation, will lead to the collapse of the fishery. Individual rationality leads to severely suboptimal outcomes. Under these circumstances an appeal to conscience is useless, as it merely places the recipient of the appeal in a 'double-bind'. The open appeal is 'behave as a responsible citizen, or you will be condemned. But there is also a covert appeal in the opposite direction; 'If you do behave as we ask, we will secretly condemn you for a simpleton who can be shamed into standing aside while the rest of us exploit the commons' (Hardin, 1968: 246). Thus the appeal creates the imperative both to behave responsibly and to avoid being a sucker. In terms of democracy, what this entails is that, in general, we have to be prepared to accept coercion in order to overcome the collective action problem.5 The Leviathan of the state is the institution that has the political power required to solve this conundrum. 'Mutual coercion, mutually agreed on" is Hardin's famous solution to the tragedy of the commons. Revisiting the 'tragedy' argument in 1998, Hardin held that '[i]ts message is, I think, still true today. Individualism is cherished because it produces freedom, but the gift is conditional: The more population exceeds the carrying capacity of the environment, the more freedoms must be given up' (Hardin, 1998: 682). On this view coercion is an integral part of politics: the state coerces when it taxes, or when it prevents us from robbing banks. Coercion has, however, become 'a dirty word for most liberals now' (Hardin, 1968: 1246) but this does not have to be the case as long as this coercion comes about as a result of the democratic will. This however, requires overcoming the problems raised by the likes of Ophuls and Westra, that is, it is dependent upon the assumption that people can agree to coerce each other in order to realise their long-term, 'enlightened' self-interest. If they cannot, and both the myopic and collective action problem ecological objections to democracy arc valid, then this coercion may not be 'mutually agreed upon' but rather imposed by Ophuls' ecological 'elite' or Westra's Aristotelian 'wise man'. Under these circumstances there seems to be no hope at all for a reconciliation of ecological imperatives and democratic decision-making: we are faced with a stark choice, democracy or ecological survival.

#### Yes your democracy --- it’s impossible to reform or modify the foundational principle of democratic freedom to make it ecologically sustainable --- only authoritarianism can ensure survival.

David **Shearman 7**, Emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, Secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an Independent Assessor on the IPCC; and Joseph Wayne Smith, lawyer and philosopher with a research interest in environmentalism, 2007, The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, p. 3-4

However putting these subjective assessments aside, our analysis of the performance of democracy is diagnostic, using science and philosophy to define the ills. Society can then move forward to discuss the remedies. We will ask, what is the true record of democracy in addressing and preventing the major issues besetting humanity today, such as war, equity, and especially environmental damage? The most important question of our time is whether the democratic system is able to grasp and remedy the emerging ecological crisis facing the entire human race. What is the precise role of liberal democracy in causing this crisis? What is its performance in remediation during the past two or three decades of increasing scientific evidence of the crisis? To further this task, several critical environmental issues will be analyzed. Many failures are diagnosed and in each instance causation is identified as the modus operandi of liberal democracy. We therefore question whether democracy can be modified or reformed to address these problems before they have become irreversible. And if not, how can humanity be governed? We argue that humanity will have to trade its liberty to live as it wishes in favor of a system where survival is paramount. Perhaps this choice should not be put for democratic approval, or humanity will elect to live as it wishes.

#### Environmental decline makes the transition to authoritarianism inevitable --- the only question is whether it can be effective

Mark **Beeson 10**, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science & International Studies, University of Birmingham, 2010, “The coming of environmental authoritarianism,” Environmental Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2, DOI:10.1080/09644010903576918

The conclusions that emerge from the following discussion are necessarily impressionistic, speculative and rather dispiriting. The empirical evidence upon which such inferences depend is, by contrast, more and more compelling and unequivocal. There is little doubt that the natural environment everywhere is under profound, perhaps irredeemable stress. Parts of Southeast Asia and China are distinctive only in having already gone further than the most of the West in the extent of the degradation that has already occurred (see Jasparro and Taylor 2008). The only issue that remains in doubt is the nature of the response to this unfolding crisis. The extent of the problem, the seemingly implacable nature of the drivers of environmental decline, the limited capacity for action at the national level and the region's unimpressive record of cooperation and environmental management do not inspire confidence. Consequently, the prospects for an authoritarian response become more likely as the material base of existence becomes less capable of sustaining life, let alone the ‘good life’ upon which the legitimacy of democratic regimes hinges.

#### This vastly outweighs the case --- preserving existence by definition has to come before any other value---worsening environmental crisis turns all of their impacts, but embracing eco-authoritarianism unites humanity and solves all war.

David **Shearman 7**, Emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, Secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an Independent Assessor on the IPCC; and Joseph Wayne Smith, lawyer and philosopher with a research interest in environmentalism, 2007, The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, p. 85-86

Our position differs from Wolff and other anarchists also insofar as we reject the principle of autonomy, the foundation belief of liberalism. It is the argument of this work that liberalism has essentially overdosed on freedom and liberty. It is true that freedom and liberty are important values, but such values are by no means fundamental or ultimate values. These values are far down the list of what we believe to be core values based upon an ecological philosophy of humanity: survival and the integrity of ecological systems. Without such values, values such as freedom and autonomy make no sense at all. If one is not living, one cannot be free. Indeed liberal freedom essentially presupposes the idea of a sustainable life for otherwise the only freedom that the liberal social world would have would be to perish in a polluted environment.

The issue of values calls into question the Western view of the world or perhaps more specifically the viewpoint that originates from Anglo Saxon development. It is significant that the “clash of civilizations” thinking espoused by Samuel Huntington, a precursor of the neoconservatives, has generated much debate and support. Huntington’s analysis involves potential conflict between “Western universalism, Muslim militancy and Chinese assertion.”18 The divisions are based on cultural inheritance. It is a world in which enemies are essential for peoples seeking identity and where the most severe conflicts lie at the points where the major civilizations of the world clash. Hopefully this viewpoint will be superseded, for humanity no longer has time for the indulgence of irrational hates. The important clash will not be of civilizations but of values. The fault line cuts across all civilizations. It is a clash of values between the conservatives and the consumers. The latter are well described in this book. They rule the world economically, and their thinking excludes true care for the future of the world. The conservatives at present are a powerless polyglot of scientists, environmentalists, farming and subsistence communities, and peoples of various religious faiths, including a minority of right-wing creationists who think that God wishes the world to be cared for. They recognize the environmental perils and place their banishment as the preeminent task of humanity. The fight for minds, not liberal democracy, will determine the future of the world’s population. If conservative thought prevails it may unite humanity in common cause and heal the cultural fault lines.

#### Outweighs their ethics – lifeboat ethics turn and outweigh their feel-good impacts

**Elliott and Lamm, 2** - \*Emeritus Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Florida and \*\*former Governor of Colorado, Professor at the University of Denver, Executive Director of the University of Denver’s Center for Public Policy and Contemporary Issues

(Herschel and Richard D, “A Moral Code for a Finite World,” The Chronicle Review, Volume 49, Issue 12, Page B0, The Chronicle of Higher Education, November 15, 2002, <http://chronicle.com/free/v49/i12/12b00701.htm>)

What if global warming is a reality, and expanding human activity is causing irreparable harm to the ecosystem? What if the demands of a growing human population and an expanding global economy are causing our oceans to warm up, our ice caps to melt, our supply of edible fish to decrease, our rain forests to disappear, our coral reefs to die, our soils to be eroded, our air and water to be polluted, and our weather to include a growing number of floods and droughts? What if it is sheer hubris to believe that our species can grow without limits? What if the finite nature of the earth's resources imposes limits on what human beings can morally do? What if our present moral code is ecologically unsustainable? A widely cited article from the journal Science gives us one answer. Garrett Hardin's "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968) demonstrated that when natural resources are held in common -- freely available to everyone for the taking -- the incentives that normally direct human activity lead people to steadily increase their exploitation of the resources until they are inadequate to meet human needs. The exploiters generally do not intend to cause any harm; they are merely taking care of their own needs, or those of others in want. Nevertheless, the entire system moves inexorably to disaster. Everyone in the world shares in the resulting tragedy of the commons. Today, our standard of living, our economic system, and the political stability of our planet all require the increasing use of energy and natural resources. In addition, much of our political, economic, and social thinking assumes a continuous expansion of economic activity, with little or no restraint on our use of resources. We all feel entitled to grow richer every year. Social justice requires an expanding pie to share with those who are less fortunate. Progress is growth; the economies of developed nations require steady increases in consumption. What if such a scenario is unsustainable? What if we need an ethics for a finite world, an ethics of the commons? It is not important that you agree with the premise. What is important is that you help debate the alternatives. An ethics of the commons would require a change in the criteria by which moral claims are justified. You may believe that current rates of population growth and economic expansion can go on forever -- but debate with us what alternative ethical theories would arise if they cannot. Our thesis is that any ethical system is mistaken and immoral if its practice would cause an environmental collapse. Many people assume that moral laws and principles are absolutely certain, that we can know the final moral truth. If moral knowledge is certain, then factual evidence is irrelevant, for it cannot limit or refute what is morally certain. Our ethics and concepts of human rights have been formulated for a world of a priori reasoning and unchanging conclusions. Kant spoke for that absolutist ethical tradition when he argued that only knowledge that is absolutely certain can justify the slavish obedience that moral law demands. He thought he had found rational grounds to justify the universal and unchanging character of moral law. Moral knowledge, he concluded, is a priori and certain. It tells us, for example, that murder, lying, and stealing are wrong. The fact that those acts may sometimes seem to benefit someone cannot diminish the absolute certainty that they are wrong. Thus, for example, it is a contradiction to state that murder can sometimes be right, for, by its very nature, murder is wrong. Many human rights are positive rights that involve the exploitation of resources. (Negative rights restrain governments and don't require resources. For example, governments shouldn't restrict our freedom of speech or tell us how to pray.) Wherever in the world a child is born, that child has all the inherent human rights -- including the right to have food, housing, and medical care, which others must provide. When positive rights are accorded equally to everyone, they first allow and then support constant growth, of both population and the exploitation of natural resources. That leads to a pragmatic refutation of the belief that moral knowledge is certain and infallible. If a growing population faces a scarcity of resources, then an ethics of universal human rights with equality and justice for all will fail. Those who survive will inevitably live by a different ethics. Once the resources necessary to satisfy all human needs become insufficient, our options will be bracketed by two extremes. One is to ration resources so that everyone may share the inadequate supplies equally and justly. The other is to have people act like players in a game of musical chairs. In conditions of scarcity, there will be more people than chairs, so some people will be left standing when the music stops. Some -- the self-sacrificing altruists -- will refuse to take the food that others need, and so will perish. Others, however, will not play by the rules. Rejecting the ethics of a universal and unconditional moral law, they will fight to get the resources they and their children need to live. Under neither extreme, nor all the options in between, does it make sense to analyze the problem through the lens of human rights. The flaw in an ethical system of universal human rights, unqualified moral obligations, and equal justice for all can be stated in its logically simplest form: If to try to live by those principles under conditions of scarcity causes it to be impossible to live at all, then the practice of that ethics will cease. Scarcity renders such formulations useless and ultimately causes such an ethics to become extinct. We have described not a world that we want to see, but one that we fear might come to be. Humans cannot have a moral duty to deliver the impossible, or to supply something if the act of supplying it harms the ecosystem to the point where life on earth becomes unsustainable. Moral codes, no matter how logical and well reasoned, and human rights, no matter how compassionate, must make sense within the limitations of the ecosystem; we cannot disregard the factual consequences of our ethics. If acting morally compromises the ecosystem, then moral behavior must be rethought. Ethics cannot demand a level of resource use that the ecosystem cannot tolerate. The consequences of human behavior change as the population grows. Most human activities have a point of moral reversal, before which they may cause great benefit and little harm, but after which they may cause so much harm as to overwhelm their benefits. Here are a few representative examples, the first of which is often cited when considering Garrett Hardin's work: In a nearly empty lifeboat, rescuing a drowning shipwreck victim causes benefit: It saves the life of the victim, and it adds another person to help manage the boat. But in a lifeboat loaded to the gunwales, rescuing another victim makes the boat sink and causes only harm: Everyone drowns. When the number of cars on a road is small, traveling by private car is a great convenience to all. But as the cars multiply, a point of reversal occurs: The road now contains so many cars that such travel is inconvenient. The number of private cars may increase to the point where everyone comes to a halt. Thus, in some conditions, car travel benefits all. In other conditions, car travel makes it impossible for anyone to move. It can also pump so much carbon dioxide into the atmosphere that it alters the world's climate. Economic growth can be beneficial when land, fuel, water, and other needed resources are abundant. But it becomes harmful when those resources become scarce, or when exploitation causes ecological collapse. Every finite environment has a turning point, at which further economic growth would produce so much trash and pollution that it would change from producing benefit to causing harm. After that point is reached, additional growth only increases scarcity and decreases overall productivity. In conditions of scarcity, economic growth has a negative impact. Every environment is finite. Technology can extend but not eliminate limits. An acre of land can support only a few mature sugar maples; only so many radishes can grow in a five-foot row of dirt. Similar constraints operate in human affairs. When the population in any environment is small and natural resources plentiful, every additional person increases the welfare of all. As more and more people are added, they need increasingly to exploit the finite resources of the environment. At a certain point, the members of an increasing population become so crowded that they stop benefiting each other; by damaging the environment that supports everyone, by limiting the space available to each person, and by increasing the amount of waste and pollution, their activity begins to cause harm. That is, population growth changes from good to bad. And if the population continues to expand, its material demands may so severely damage the environment as to cause a tragedy of the commons -- the collapse of both environment and society.

#### Their ethics link to the DA and cause extinction

**Rohe, 6** – J.D, Board of Directors of the Federation for American Immigration Reform

(John F, “Book Review of "Ethics for a Finite World" by Herschel Elliott,” The Social Contract Journal, Volume 16, Number 2, Winter 2005-2006, <http://www.thesocialcontract.com/artman2/publish/tsc1602/article_1381.shtml>)

Conventional ethics are enshrined in the United Nations' "universal human rights." The rights mandate is self-perpetuating as long as the biological web is accommodating. The mandate, however, bears no relationship to an ecosystem's ability to offer support. Rights are unrelated to the cause of hardship. In a world of abundance, the U.N. ethics offer a rational framework. Amid scarcity, however, universal human rights become a recipe for desperation and extinction. The ethic turns on itself. It devours its subjects. Elliot's ethical analysis exposes human vulnerability. As scarcities expand, universal human rights assure universal human collapse. Unqualified aid to overpopulated regions, for example, subsidizes overpopulation, the very cause of hardship. Unqualified aid and a growth ethic divorces responsibility for overpopulation from responsibility for remedial measures. In time, the ethic inflicts dispassionate cruelty. It conflicts with biological standards of decency. Nevertheless, it comports with the U.N.'s ethical mandate. Every species tests the carrying capacity of its niche in the ecosystem. To breach the carrying capacity is to enroll in a hazardous Darwinian experiment. Striking a responsible biological balance might not be humanity's preferred choice, but it is an ungovernable reality. Natural systems will be the final arbiter. Rules in this domain are unappealable. Elliott proffers an ethical system based less on human hopes and more on biological realities. Biological imperatives clash with Western notions of how things ought to be. Elliott reminds us of Vice President Cheney's mantra "Our lifestyle is not negotiable." Perhaps Cheney has never negotiated with vanishing fossil fuel reserves. Manmade laws are not necessarily reconcilable with the laws of nature. Yogi Berra concludes "Nature bats last." Our growth ethic has been assuaged by the fortuitous discovery of abundant resources. Blinded by the dizzying treasure trove of resources and fossil fuels, we have been lulled into a human-centered ethical system. The endowment, however, remains finite. As limits are approached, the momentum of unchecked growth (in human numbers or consumption) is destined to be arrested.